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Russian space program in ten to twelve
years; and perhaps it will overtake the
American program as well” (p. 585).
As in previous volumes in the series,
Chertok documents the toils of Soviet
designers, who were remunerated
poorly, subjected to difficult working
conditions, and hidden from foreign
sight and contact. Chertok learned of his
nation’s deployment of missiles to Cuba,
for instance, from Kennedy’s speech (p.
95)! Driven in part by heartfelt ideals
tempered by knowledge of the horrors of
the Stalin era, these designers achieved
so much, so quickly, under such
formidable constraints—truly amazing
accomplishments. Theirs is not only a
Soviet legacy, rooted now in a bygone
era, but a part of a larger human legacy
that will inspire further exploration as
mankind moves farther into space.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON

America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, by Andrew J. Bacevich. New York:
Random House, 2016. 453 pages. $30.

The most recent book by Andrew
Bacevich—a retired U.S. Army colonel
and now-retired professor of history
and international relations at Boston
University—details the history of
the four-decade U.S. involvement in
“the Greater Middle East,” a region
Bacevich defines as encompassing
areas of the Persian Gulf, North
Africa, and the Balkans.
The book starts with the formulation of
the Carter Doctrine: how the OPEC oil
embargo, the Iranian Revolution, and
the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, combined with America’s need for
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oil and the fact that most of the world’s
oil at the time came from this area, led
then-president Jimmy Carter to declare
the security and stability of this region
to be a vital national interest. Bacevich
believes the doctrine created a broad,
open-ended commitment that expanded
with time. Early in the book he describes
the decision making, strategy and
policy development, and organizational
changes that positioned the United
States as the guarantor of regional
security. This was the context for the
formation of U.S. Central Command,
which included in its geographic area of
responsibility not only the Persian Gulf
states but a total of nineteen countries,
including Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia,
Kenya, and Pakistan. Bacevich argues
that this new combatant command
created both an expectation of and the
pretext for future military intervention
in the Central Command region. The
“Soviet threat of the 1980s served as a
placeholder, providing a handy rationale
for developing capabilities subsequently
put to other purposes”; that “posture justified by the need to defend the Persian
Gulf from outside intrusion positioned
the United States itself to intrude.”
Bacevich offers a broad overview of
significant events in this area of the
world over the last thirty-five years. In
addition to the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and America’s
support of the mujahideen “freedom
fighters,” Bacevich discusses the Marine
Corps barracks bombing in Lebanon,
the U.S. attack against Mu‘ammar
Gadhafi in Libya, and the war between
Iraq and Iran. His broad synthesis
similarly includes Somalia, Saddam
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the
ensuing Gulf War, the conflict in the
Balkans, and, of course, the attacks of
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September 11 and the subsequent wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the
current fight against Al Qaeda and ISIS.
One of the great strengths of this book is
the way Bacevich brings all these events
together in sufficient detail to enable
the reader to take in “the whole picture.”
It allows one to put these events into
greater context and see the patterns that
have developed. In short, it performs
a very complete assessment of where
we have been, what assumptions the
leaders of the United States have made,
what policy decisions were made on the
basis of those assumptions, and what
the outcomes have been to this time.
Toward the book’s end, Bacevich asks
two very pointed questions. First, why
“has the world’s mightiest military
achieved so little even while itself
absorbing very considerable losses and
inflicting even greater damage on the
subjects of America’s supposed beneficence?” Second, why, “in the face of
such unsatisfactory outcomes[,] has the
United States refused to chart a different
course?” Bacevich goes on to offer what
he believes are the answers to these
questions, then ends by arguing that, in
light of new technology that allows more
oil reserves to become accessible in the
Western Hemisphere, the United States
would be better served by securing
its “own neighborhood rather than
vainly attempting to police the Greater
Middle East.” The question that comes to
mind—one with which I’m sure our national leaders wrestle—is this: What will
happen to this region, and subsequently
the world, if the United States stops its
involvement in the Greater Middle East?
This well-researched book is a mustread for all of us who study, plan, and
execute the military arm of national
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power—and especially for those who
make decisions about national policy.
ROGER DUCEY

Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War,
ed. Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins.
Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press,
2015. 486 pages. $21.95.

Augmenting the literature of firsthand
accounts by senior leaders such as
General Stanley McChrystal and
Ambassador Christopher Hill, National
Defense University faculty members
Richard Hooker and Joseph Collins
assembled a strong team to make sense
of the last fifteen years of war. The editors appreciate the challenges of writing
current history, but offer the book as “an
assessment of two unfinished campaigns, written for future senior officers,
their key advisors, and other national
security professionals.” With more than
three million U.S. and coalition veterans
of Iraq and Afghanistan, few undertakings are more important. Veterans of
today will shape the future of defense
over the next twenty years, just as their
forebears, such as Anthony Zinni, Colin
Powell, and Richard Holbrooke, were
shaped by their Vietnam experiences.
The chapters are at their best when
they leverage insights from both senior
military and civilian leaders to reach
important conclusions, such as the
following: “Civilian national security decisionmakers need a better understanding of the complexity of military strategy
and the military’s need for planning
guidance. Senior military officers for
their part require a deep understanding
of the interagency decisionmaking
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